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Abstract
Real behaviors are binding consequential commitments to a course of action, such as harming 
another person, buying an Apple watch, or fleeing from danger. Cognitive scientists are generally 
interested in the psychological and neural processes that cause such real behavior. However, for 
practical reasons, many scientific studies measure behavior using only hypothetical or imagined 
stimuli. Generalizing from such studies to real behavior implicitly assumes that the processes 
underlying the two types of behavior are similar. We review evidence of similarity and differences 
in hypothetical and real mental processes. In many cases, hypothetical choice tasks give an 
incomplete picture of brain circuitry that is active during real choice.
Understanding How the Brain Makes Actual Choices
Social science seeks to understand the causes of the choices that people make which affect 
their lives. Isolating possible causes in artificial experiments is easier when an experiment is 
simple, but a simple design can always be criticized on the grounds that it is too simple to be 
realistic. One limit on realism is that experimental subjects often make hypothetical choices 
with no direct consequences to them (unlike in corresponding real decisions). There may be 
limits to how well hypothetical choice, and associated brain activity, approximates real 
choice and activity. There may be similar differences between brain and behavior when 
objects are presented more or less realistically (e.g., a 2D image compared with an actual 
object).
There are likely to be two types of differences between hypothetical and real behavior: 
differences in naturalistic intensity of stimuli (see Glossary), and differences in what neural 
mechanisms are used to make choices. Consider fear as an example (discussed further later). 
Seeing a 2D image of a tarantula is likely to provoke less intensely arousing emotion than 
seeing an actual tarantula crawling toward your foot; the crawling tarantula has more 
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naturalistic intensity. That is, fearful emotion could be encoded in the same regions in the 
picture and actual conditions, but activity will be stronger and more widespread when the 
tarantula is real. In addition, the actual tarantula getting closer to your foot is likely to 
activate specialized neural circuitry (e.g., motor preparation for movement, and ancient 
evolutionarily conserved survival regions such as periaqueductal gray). Another example, 
also previewing studies discussed in the following section, is that overlapping value regions 
are active, whether choices are either hypothetical or real, during charitable giving and 
paying to avoid eating unpleasant food. However, the amygdala is only active during those 
choices in the real condition.
We evaluate evidence of differences in hypothetical and real behavior and brain activity in 
five domains: sociality, morality, emotion, economic choice, and vision. In almost all cases, 
there are substantial differences in behavior and brain based on the realism of stimuli (in 
vision) or on whether choices have actual consequences, such as financial reward, receiving 
shocks, buying consumer products, or eating unpleasant food.
Social Neuroscience
Social neuroscience is a relatively new field that integrates concepts from social psychology 
and methods from cognitive neuroscience. To date, there has been little work comparing 
hypothetical and real choice, but interesting work has attempted to increase the degree of 
realism in the form of true live interaction between multiple subjects. Social neuroscientists 
have studied interactions when one subject is inside an MRI scanner, and is making choices 
that can be influenced by interaction with one or more subjects who are outside of the 
scanner. Various experiments have studied empathy [1], social distance [2], social approval 
[3], moral behavior [4], and advice giving [5], with each pointing to new insights into the 
social brain. While these paradigms overcome the problems of passive observation of social 
stimuli (e.g., observing a face), they are not truly interactive because they reflect only the 
one-directional 1D outcome of one’s own behavior on another person (sometimes called 
‘spectatorial approaches’ [6] because subjects merely observe other people or contemplate 
the others’ mental states). A ‘two-directional’ approach, using real-time social encounters 
in which all subjects make choices that influence each other’s rewards, is an important step 
forward [7] (see Outstanding Questions).
Two-directional interactive approaches have been used in several studies. Two pioneering 
studies used simultaneous fMRI ‘hyperscanning’ of two subjects playing a financial game 
requiring economic trust [7,8]. One subject chooses how much money to invest, which 
triples in value; a second subject then chooses how much of that sum to share (and can keep 
it all) [9]. Hyperscanning was also used to study formation of ‘bubbles’ – price paths that 
grow unrealistically high and then crash. In these experimental markets, subjects chose the 
prices at which they trade with each other [10]. In two hyperscanning studies on bargaining, 
one subject first chose to say how much they would pay to buy an object, and the second 
subject chose whether to sell the object at that price or not [11,12]. Amygdala activity was 
associated with suspicion that the first subject was ‘lowballing’, understating what she could 
really pay.
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Another design [13] used live interaction between a subject being scanned and subjects 
outside of the scanner, while the subjects engaged in social interaction and joint attention 
tasks. During live social interactions, compared with recorded ones, there was more activity 
in many cortical mentalizing regions, including the posterior superior temporal sulcus, 
temporoparietal junction, and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). The posterior superior 
temporal sulcus was more active during joint compared to solo attention, supporting the idea 
that this region is involved in social attention.
In the ‘pragmatics’ approach to language, speech acts are viewed as choices intended to 
solve a joint action problem. Although not interactive, studies have used intersubject 
correlations to examine the coordination of natural speech and speech comprehension by 
motor, linguistic, and extralinguistic speech production systems [14,15]. In these studies, 
subjects are either speakers and listeners. Speakers are trained to precisely reproduce a 15-
min long narrative. There was a robust coupling of time-locked neural activity between 
speaker and listener. When speaker–listener communication failed, this neural coupling 
disappeared. This realistic speaker–listener coordination also found overlapping neural 
activity that was bilateral and more widely neurally distributed than has been observed in 
less lifelike tasks (which typically only show speech and comprehension overlap reliably in 
left hemisphere language areas). In other words, brain scanning during less realistic speech 
tasks gives an incomplete picture.
Moral Neuroscience
Early studies on the neural basis of moral judgment used macabre vignettes plucked from 
moral philosophy. An example is the ‘trolley dilemma’ [16]: A trolley is heading down on a 
track toward five people, who will be killed unless the trolley does not reach them. A subject 
decides whether to push a heavy man off a bridge onto the track, sacrificing one person (the 
heavy man) to save the five people it is barreling toward. In the contrasting scenario, the 
subject can throw a switch to divert the trolley from its current path to a different side track, 
where it will kill one person, but will save the lives of the five people on the main track. The 
dilemma pits a utilitarian intuition (killing one is justified by saving five) against a 
deontological rule (thou shalt not kill). It also varies the degree of the subject’s 
responsibility (or so-called agency) – pushing a person compared to throwing a switch. 
These spectatorial paradigms have created evidence about neural regions associated with 
different kinds of moral judgment, under varying personal agency. However, subjects’ 
judgments in such abstract situations could be influenced by nuisance concerns about 
plausibility (e.g., would a heavy body really divert a 16 000-lb trolley?) and uncontrolled 
filling-in of details. Decision based on self-guides, including the ideal-self (what I would 
ideally would choose) and ought-self (what I should or ought to choose) [17], may not 
forecast what people actually do in such situations [18,19].
Creating real moral dilemmas with actual consequences is constrained by ethical concerns 
and requires creativity, but it can be done. A motivation for using real dilemmas comes from 
the famous 1970s studies of obedience to [20], and abuse of [21] authority in experimental 
settings that were real (or subjects thought were real). Those results were surprising because 
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if subjects had been asked, hypothetically, what they would do, most would predict behavior 
different than what was observed in the real situations.
In a recent modern study [22], the trolley dilemma was transformed to decisions about 
which of two groups of African orphans would have different numbers of lunches actually 
donated to them. Redirecting a moving ball toward one group of lunch receivers, or leaving 
its path toward a different group undisturbed, created the sense of personal agency 
corresponding to throwing the switch in the trolley problem. Activity in the insula was 
associated with unequal treatment of the two groups of orphans, but no strong neural 
correlates of intervening versus leaving the ball’s path undisturbed were seen.
Another example is a so-called pain versus gain dilemma [4,23]. Subjects endowed with 
money could pay to reduce the level of painful shock administered to strangers (who were 
believed to be in an adjacent room). More money would buy a bigger reduction in the shock 
level. Subjects act more selfishly in the real condition – paying less money, and therefore 
allowing stronger shocks to others – than in an imaginary hypothetical condition. In another 
study, subjects underestimate how likely they are to cheat on a maths task, compared to how 
much they actually cheat [19]. In general, people act more like their so-called ought-self, 
like a moral ideal, in the hypothetical versions of these tasks (Figure 1) [24].
Brain imaging has shown a mechanistic difference between real and hypothetical moral 
behavior. In a hypothetical pain versus gain dilemma [4], there was increased activity in the 
collection of brain areas known as the imagination network, which include the posterior 
cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and mPFC (Box 1 and Figure 2). However, when subjects 
made real moral decisions, there was increased activity in the bilateral amygdala and 
bilateral temporoparietal junction, regions involved in negative affect and mentalizing about 
others. A recent study [22] compared real and hypothetical charitable donations during 
fMRI. They found a typical hypothetical bias – participants donate less when choices have 
real consequences but only in females (there is a marginally significant opposite effect in 
males). They found stronger amygdala activity during real choice. The insula response to 
viewing charity pictures before the donation decision was also predictive of whether 
individuals actually made donations in the real condition.
Affective Neuroscience: Fear and Courage
Most stimuli used to study human emotion are not likely to evoke all the functional human 
responses that are present in natural, dynamic contexts. A 2D picture of an angry face will 
elicit activity in threat attention circuitry (e.g., amygdala). However, in natural situations, an 
angry face is expressing an emotion of another person, who is in 3D and may be moving, 
which is likely to evoke more intense fear and preparation for flight. To observe a fuller 
range of neural activity in response to natural stimuli than in 2D picture studies, one group 
[25] had subjects view a nearby tarantula spider during fMRI. Via an artificial video feed, 
participants thought they were watching a live tarantula placed randomly into each of five 
compartments in a customized ‘imminence box’. The tarantula was placed near or far away 
from each subject’s foot. fMRI showed switches from anxiety circuits to fear circuits as the 
tarantula was placed closer, activity in vigilance circuits of the amygdala and bed nucleus of 
the stria terminalis when subjects were monitoring the movement direction of the tarantula, 
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and amygdala activity in response to expectancy errors (surprise) when the tarantula was 
rated as scarier, during the task, than was previously predicted. These results are similar to 
the results of another study showing a sequence of 2D tarantula pictures every 250 ms, 
which mimics the experience of a tarantula getting closer [26], although the actual 3D 
tarantula presence showed stronger and more distributed neural activity than the picture 
series.
A similar study [27] explored fear and courage, by scanning snake phobics and nonphobics 
while a live snake sat on a conveyer belt that could be moved nearer or farther from the back 
of their heads. When subjects ‘courageously’ made the choice to move the snake closer, their 
brains showed increased neural activity in the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
decreased activity in the amygdala. The tarantula and snake experiments go beyond simpler 
approaches such as showing subjects passive images of snakes and spiders, which have 
limited affective realism and illustrate that real threatening stimuli evoke activity in parallel 
circuits involved in threat assessment and overcoming one’s fears.
Economic Decision Making
Real and Imagined Reward—A large number of studies in experimental psychology and 
economics compare hypothetical choices with real choices (almost always involving 
financial reward). While qualitative features of the behavior are typically close, purely 
hypothetical choice overstates socially desirable behavior, particularly altruism [24], 
cooperativeness, and patience [28] compared with real behavior under modest incentives 
[29].
Three neuroimaging studies explored both behavioral and circuitry differences. One study 
[30] compared real financial rewards in a reversal learning task with imagined rewards of a 
subject’s own choosing (about half chose to imagine money). Real rewards activated a wide 
network of regions in the parietal and temporal cortices, but the conjunction of real and 
imagined reward activated only the medial orbitofrontal cortex. This result is evidence that 
the medial orbitofrontal cortex generally computes goal value, but it also implies that 
activation during merely imagined reward does not give the full picture of actual reward 
circuitry. Real rewards also exerted an undue influence in learning valuations, when 
equivalent hypothetical rewards also carry information about ideal choices [31]. Activity in 
the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is associated with a bias in favor 
of choosing real-rewarding stimuli, while frontal pole activity appears to suppress the bias 
[32]. A comparison of real and hypothetical choices of money rewards offered with shorter 
or longer delays (in the delay discounting paradigm) showed no differences in the rates of 
choosing larger delayed rewards. There were also only tiny differences in activation. Given 
these results, there is an obvious need for more studies comparing hypothetical and real 
choice in different domains.
Contingent Valuation—In economics, there is skepticism about the quality of 
hypothetical choice data (including many surveys) on the presumption that people will not 
bother to thoughtfully or accurately report what they would do unless they are motivated by 
incentives. This skepticism is the main reason why experimental economists always pay 
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subjects extra money that depends on the choices they make [33]. A prominent way in which 
the difference between hypothetical and real choices influences economic practice is the 
‘contingent valuation method’ (CVM; Box 2). CVM is a survey method for measuring the 
monetary values of goods and services that are not traded in markets, such as clean air or 
environmental damage from oil spills. However, hypothetical contingent valuations 
generate monetary values that seem to be very high. In a few cases, experiments have been 
able to actually implement choices with real consequences (e.g., buying a goose hunter’s 
permit from them [34]) and compare those valuations with hypothetical ones for the same 
goods. The hypothetical monetary values are invariably higher than monetary values from 
real implementations (around twice as high, or more [35]).
Consumer Choice—A similar hypothetical overstatement of value is common in 
consumer choice: As a whole, prospective consumers typically report a probability of 
choosing to buy a product, which is too high compared with how often products are actually 
purchased [36,37]. As with CVM, many studies try to forecast actual buying rates by 
correcting for hypothetical bias either statistically, through instruction, or with hybrid 
methods [38–40]. Two studies have looked for neural differences in intensity and 
mechanisms between hypothetical and real purchases. Subjects either chose how much to 
pay for appetitive consumer products (e.g., a backpack, a wireless mouse [41]) or chose how 
much to pay to avoid eating aversive foods (e.g., liverwurst, 1 Tbs wasabi, [42]). In both 
studies, participants first make a series of hypothetical choices or valuations. Then they are 
surprised by a series of real decisions about other products and foods. (The decisions are real 
because they may actually buy a product or eat an aversive food, depending on the choices 
they made.) In hypothetical trials, they paid US$6.25 more for consumer products than in 
real trials (from a range US$0 to US$50), and they paid about US$.30 less (from a range US
$0 to US$3) to avoid unpleasant food.
In choosing consumer goods, both hypothetical and real choices activate valuation areas in 
the caudate nucleus and vmPFC (in response to higher values), though brain activation is 
stronger and more widespread in the real choice condition. In addition, there is distinct 
activity in the ventral ACC only during real trials, broadly consistent with other studies 
showing ACC activity in conflict monitoring and behavior adjustment [43]. In valuing 
unpleasant foods, several areas (vmPFC, ACC, insula, amygdala, and thalamus) were 
significantly more activated in real decision making. Most of these regions were also 
correlated with disgust ratings, but only during real decision making. That is, even though 
the visual images of food are exactly the same, simply anticipating the prospect of actually 
eating the food activates distinct corticotemporal areas.
In principle, neural activity could be used to calibrate hypothetical choices to identify those 
which are most likely to correspond to real choices. (By analogy, single unit recording, 
electroencephalogram, and fMRI recording can accurately classify true memories from mis-
recalled ones [44].) This method could be particularly useful in predicting actual behavior 
when valuations are implicitly known, or likely to be self-reported with bias, such as vices 
and virtues (e. g., smoking and exercise) or racial discrimination [45]. Recent studies linking 
brain activity to later natural behavior illustrate the promise of this ‘brain-as-predictor’ 
approach to understanding natural behavior (see the section below).
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One historical way in which a possible realism gap has been described is the concept of 
‘ecologically valid’ experimental design – that is, designs that present stimuli and decisions 
that resemble those in everyday life. For the study of vision, James Gibson [46] proposed the 
concept of ecological optics: Gibson thought that perception is not only about sensation, but 
is also concerned with detecting information, and that the perceiver and the environment are 
inseparable parts of an integrated system [46]. Modern visual neuroscience has sometimes 
neglected Gibson’s views.
The study of the visual system has produced one of the strongest bodies of work in 
neuroscience. However, the visual system is embedded in a set of feed-forward and feedback 
networks, and is prone to misperceptions that can only be mirrored in real settings. Indeed, 
there is suggestive evidence that basic mechanisms change between viewing of real objects 
compared to pictures. (Note, by the way, that the 2D vs. real 3D difference is not exactly a 
difference between hypothetical and real, per se; it is a difference in the degree of feature 
realism in presentation of stimuli.) For example, when subjects repeatedly viewed real 3D 
objects, compared to 2D pictures of the same objects, there is differential suppression in the 
lateral occipital cortex, a region important in the processing of object perception. While it is 
still unknown what mechanisms support the differences between real and 2D processing of 
objects, the authors propose that real 3D objects differ from 2D pictures of objects, not only 
in terms of their stereoscopic depth cues, but also with respect to tangibility and the 
relevance of the object for grasping and interaction, which lead to differences in neural 
encoding [47]. Only recently did work show that visual working memory capacity, and 
associated duration of activation, is higher for natural objects than for artificial stimuli such 
as abstract color squares [48]. This type of evidence supports the Gibsonian view [46] that 
many studies in visual neuroscience are probing a lesser version of the real world. Little is 
known about how differences in visual perception relate to choice, although one behavioral 
study found that people valued foods and simple consumer items more when those actual 
objects were nearby (3D) and accessible, rather than pictured (2D) on a computer screen 
[49].
Systematic Mistakes in Personal Choice Forecasting
Our review so far has compared hypothetical and real choice differences in behavior, and in 
the brain. Another domain in which such differences could be important is in choices that 
have real consequences in the future. Examples include committing to do public speaking in 
a month, picking a college, or getting pregnant. In these cases, the initial choice does have 
real consequences, but it is possible that current brain activity treats the choice similar to a 
hypothetical one, by not mentally simulating exactly what the real future experience will be 
like. Indeed, social psychologists have shown errors in affective forecasting, particularly a 
general underestimation of the capacity of a so-called emotional immune system to cope 
with setbacks such as severe illness or unemployment [50,51]. In decision making, 
underestimating the difference between current mental states and future ones (even when 
they are predictably different), in a way that influences choice, is called projection bias 
[52]. An example of this biasis that people buy more caloric food if they shop when hungry 
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[53]. Another example is charitable giving: Pledges to give for large-scale disaster relief, 
made when empathy is highest, are often reneged upon later (even by governments [54]). 
Another large body of evidence traces procrastination, and lapses of self-control to an 
implicit naïve hope that future decisions will be more forward-looking [55]. In these 
situations, even when current decisions are real, if the consequences are in the future, then 
neural activity may resemble hypothetical thinking – for example, by using the imagination 
network. To our knowledge, there is no neural evidence of these forecasting and projection 
biases, or whether any such biases correspond to hypothetical–real differences.
Brain Activity and Natural Real-World Behavior
Neural measures and natural behavior can be more closely linked in at least two different 
ways. One way is to study brain activity and structure of unusually expert subjects. Most 
experiments use subjects who are not expert in a task, to study decision making with no pre-
existing contaminating influences. However, most important real decisions are made by 
people who are highly expert, or at least experienced; a full account of the neural basis of 
choice should include measures of experts’ behavior and activity. To examine the neural 
basis of navigation expertise, one study turned to London taxi drivers [56]. These drivers 
pass an examination (called The Knowledge) learning 25 000 streets within a 6-mile radius 
of Central London. The exam is difficult: Drivers usually take an average of 34 months and 
12 attempts to pass. Using voxel-based morphometry to measure gray matter density, taxi 
drivers had higher gray matter density in the posterior hippocampus than a control group. 
Density in that region also positively correlated with the length of months on the job.
A second direction, the so-called brain-as-predictor approach, correlates brain activity 
measured during exposure to different stimuli with subsequent actual postexperimental 
behavior [57–59]. For example, that to predict actual smoking 1 month later, adding activity 
in the mPFC from prediction based only on self-reported responses to viewing anti-smoking 
adverts doubled the R2 from using only the self-reports to predict [58]. Other studies have 
predicted smoking cessation from activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex [60], weight 
gain from response to food images [61,62], online microfinance donations from nucleus 
accumbens response to borrower website blurbs [63], cortisol secretion from amygdala–
vmPFC coupling [64], and addiction relapse. The goal is to produce increases in predictive 
accuracy of important natural behavior beyond self-report and other observables. The largest 
increases are likely to come in choice domains where correlates of behavior are revealed by 
brain activity, even though those predictors are implicit and inaccessible to subjects, or 
subjects may self-report inaccurately due to social desirability, as in addiction.
Concluding Remarks
Many areas of behavioral social science and cognitive neuroscience show differences 
between behavior and brain during hypothetical and real choice. The theme we have 
emphasized is that there are typically differences in the intensity of neural activation when 
subjects make real versus hypothetical choices. In addition, there are often distinct patterns 
of neural activation when subjects make real choices, presumably reflecting distinct neural 
mechanisms that are only engaged by real choices. The unpleasant implication is that studies 
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based on hypothetical choice can give an incomplete picture of brain activity during real 
choice. For this reason, it would be valuable to have more studies comparing hypothetical 
and real choice within a common paradigm. Then proper meta-analysis can be done, and 
provide guidance about when hypothetical choice gives the most incomplete picture.
Two caveats are important to mention: First, neural activation during real and hypothetical 
choices is, in some cases, highly overlapping, with only small differences between these 
conditions (e.g., [32]). And in a nonchoice domain such as motor actions, brain scans 
typically show substantial overlap between activity during imagined and real movements (e. 
g., [65]). The simple mention of action words (e.g., kick, punch) also activates the same 
somatotopic motor areas as real motor actions [66]. Second, there will always be types of 
choices in which implementing real consequences experimentally is impossible or unethical 
(including highly rewarding, highly aversive, temporally distant, and morally charged 
choices). Experiments in these domains with hypothetical choices will obviously continue to 
be useful. However, any innovative methods that make stimuli more lifelike (e.g., virtual 
reality, or bidirectional social interactions) are likely to make evidence from even 
hypothetical choices a better guess about what mechanisms are involved in real choice.
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the degree to which a laboratory stimulus evokes the same emotion it would evoke in its 
natural setting. For example, a picture of an angry face might capture our attention more 
than a neutral face, yet an angry person actually staring at us might evoke even more 
emotions and behaviors including extreme fear, flight or fight, and visual search for a threat 
source
Contingent valuations
monetary valuations that are placed on abstract goods (such as clean air, or damage from 
environmental disasters), which are not traded in markets. The valuations are derived 
‘contingent’ on some hypothetical procedure, such as voting in a referendum to pay higher 
taxes
Ecological validity
a property of paradigms that correspond to common everyday decisions and evoke 
naturalistic intensity. Such paradigms capture the dynamic integration of moment-to-
moment information, can be consequential, binding, and may have higher emotional 
intensity
Naturalistic intensity
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as an experimental task or stimulus moves from artificial to naturalistic scenario, the 
intensity of the sensory input or subjective processing gets larger. Increased naturalistic 
intensity is expected to generate stronger brain activation
Naturalistic-laboratory matching
the combined use of both real natural choices and artificial laboratory choices. The 
experimenter creates both real world and laboratory studies and compares the results to learn 
how behaviors differ between the two contexts
Projection bias
the tendency for a current mental state to bias decisions with consequences in future states 
that are predictably different than the current state. An example is shopping while very 
hungry: people buy more high-calorie food they do not want to eat in the future when they 
are less hungry
Spectatorial approach
a term defined by Schilbach and colleagues [6] describing paradigms in which the subject is 
a detached observer rather than actively interacting with people or objects in the real world. 
Spectatorial approaches can either be unidirectional (effect of one’s behaviors on others) or 
bidirectional (i.e., reciprocity)
Two-directional interactive versus one-dimensional passive
paradigms in which two or more subjects make decisions, which do (interactive) or do not 
impact other subjects (passive)
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About 10 years ago, the idea of a distinct system for personal imagination (or 
‘prospection’) about the future first began to gain empirical traction [68,69]. The 
motivating insight is an old one in cognitive psychology: Recalling a memory is not like 
opening a high-resolution JPEG file in the mind’s eye; instead, a recall is a 
reconstruction. Since the future cannot be immediately perceived, it must be constructed, 
and it is plausible that memory systems are repurposed for imagining the future 
[48,64,65].
Indeed, Hassabis et al. [68] documented an imagination network which was commonly 
activated by recall of both real and (previously) imagined memories, and also by newly 
imagined scenarios. The circuit included hippocampus bilaterally, parahippocampal 
gyrus, retrosplenial and posterior parietal cortices, middle temporal cortices, and medial 
PFC. Most of these circuit components are also evident in an original Neurosynth meta-
analysis (see Figure 2 in main text). However, in [68] real memories, the precuneus, 
posterior cingulate cortex, and mPFC are more strongly activated than in imagined ones. 
Patients with hippocampal damage and resulting amnesia (n = 5) were also impaired in 
imagining spatially coherent scenes [69], and give less detail about future episodes than 
neurotypical controls [70,71].
Patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD) typically have atrophy in the temporal pole, 
hippocampus, and mPFC. Since these atrophied regions are part of the imagination 
network, FTD patients are expected to have impairment in various kinds of future 
thinking; and indeed, there is mounting evidence of such impairments [72]. Notably, for 
this review, more ecologically valid methods that do not depend too heavily on semantic 
memory are needed to test for impairment in FTD patients with semantic dementia.
The next step is to understand more about overlaps and differences in the types of 
imagination and their behavioral function. One analysis [73] distinguished four 
component processes in imagination – simulation, prediction, intention, and planning – 
and reviewed evidence about each. However, it is not known how dissociated these 
processes are, and how precisely they interact. Intuitively, it is likely that some of these 
imagination components would only be activated in real choice, so they are candidates 
for mechanisms that are distinct to real choice.
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Contingent Valuation of Environmental Resources
How much money is a pristine lake worth? While such questions may seem repugnant, 
such trade-offs have to be made, by governments assigning financial damages to 
environmental harms, and doing cost–benefit analyses (choose: condos or condors?).
Sometimes market prices can be used to infer implicit values, a method known as 
‘revealed preference’. For example, house prices are affected by risks from nearby plants 
[74]. However, when there are no market prices, surveys are used. The CVM asks people 
how much they value nonmarket goods in various hypothetical scenarios about resource 
availability or harm. CVM values are hypothetical, but are meant to match real values 
[75].
A 1989 US court case ruled that environmental damages could include ‘nonuse’ value of 
natural resources (e.g., valuing a park you will never visit), which can only be measured 
by CVM. The 1989 Exxon ‘Valdez’ oil spill in Alaska became a high-stakes battleground 
over CVM. One study, using traditional methods of estimating market-based demand for 
recreation, concluded that the Valdez damages were US$3.8 million. A different study 
included nonuse value based on CVM surveys, and estimated damages of US$4.9 billion 
[75].
The controversial Valdez case led to an influential panel of economists to establish CVM 
guidelines [76]. Ideal CVM studies now do variants of the following: Describe the 
resource decision specifically, usually multimodally (text, photos, graphics, numbers); 
specify a realistic market or payment mechanism; and encourage honest reporting of 
values [75].
Even with specific description, hypothetical CVM values are usually much larger than 
real values (two times or more). To correct the bias, researchers have tried statistical 
calibration (e.g., the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration proposed 
dividing CVMs by two [76]), or allowing expression of attitudes along with monetary 
value [77], or requiring a so-called solemn oath to be truthful [78]. One National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration panelist wrote recently, ‘I do not expect that proponents 
and opponents of contingent valuation will ever agree’ (p. 54) [79].
Perhaps cognitive neuroscience can help. CVM surveys could include measures like 
response time, psychophysiology, facial emotion, etc. to explore biological calibration. 
fMRI measures of CVM valuations of environmental resources have been collected but 
have not yet established solid results [80,81].
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What are some inventive new experimental paradigms using naturalistic-laboratory 
matching, in which subjects interact with stimuli both in the real world and in the 
laboratory (to compare those behaviors)?
Can the imagination network – as mapped by prospective memory and mind wandering – 
differentiate hypothetical and real choice activity, and map onto natural behaviors?
What methods and paradigms can establish the adaptive function of imagination and 
prospective memory?
Can comparisons of before and after scans of real-world training (e.g., emotion training, 
juggling) show how neural systems involved in hypothetical imagination are engaged and 
disengaged?
Can increased use of intersubject correlation methods be used to examine the properties 
and consequences of real-time interaction between two or more subjects (using fMRI, 
electroencephalogram, etc.)?
Within hypothetical choice domains, what methods can be used to distinguish trials or 
individuals for whom subjective experience and biological activity are more or less real?
What can be learned from expert subjects who are highly skilled in a particular task (e.g., 
taxi drivers, air traffic controllers, athletes) to examine how expertise circuits map onto 
the imagination circuit, and are linked to performance?
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Many experiments in cognitive neuroscience use hypothetical choices, or use stimuli that 
lack some realistic features. The goal of the experiments, however, is to understand 
behavior and brain activity during real choices people make.
Hypothetical and limited-realism experiments run the risk of understating the strength of 
brain activities, or giving an incomplete picture of the neural mechanisms, which are 
evoked by real choices.
There is some evidence of differences in behavior and brain activity between hypothetical 
and real choice in domains of social, moral, and eco- nomic choice.
There are also differences in brain activity, between more or less realistic stimuli, in 
emotional reactions and in visual processing.
More studies directly comparing hypothetical and real choice are needed, as well as 
imaginative realistic paradigms.
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Figure 1. How Stimuli Are Hypothesized to Vary in Naturalistic Intensity and Evoked Neural 
Mechanisms.
The stylized graph shows naturalistic intensity on the y axis, extending from low intensity in 
a controlled laboratory setting to the higher intensity in natural real-world settings. Icons 
representing some of the studies described in this paper are all plotted low on the y axis, but 
different laboratory paradigms could have differing degrees of naturalistic intensity. The x 
axis illustrates how some laboratory stimuli and tasks (such as real vs. hypothetical choice) 
will evoke different neural mechanisms. The graph illustrates the hypothesized view that 
many laboratory tasks are low in intensity and evoke only a subset of mechanisms, 
compared to more realistic choices, which are higher in intensity and evoke a larger set of 
mechanisms. Note that the positions of the icons and the trajectories (broken lines) do not 
plot actual numerical measures of intensity or mechanisms (although measures of those 
variables could be constructed, in principle, for some paradigms with gradation in realism).
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Figure 2. Neural Circuitry of Imagination Network.
Using Neurosynth ([67]; http://neurosynth.org), we identified 29 studies that used 
imagination or prospection of future events. This identified core brain regions including the 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), posterior hippocampus (pHipp), and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC). These regions have been implicated in the resting state, mind 
wandering, and imagination, respectively. Colored regions are those identified by forward 
inference (blue) or reverse inference (red). Forward inference is based on the relative 
frequency of studies that use a functional term (imagination), which also have activation in 
an area (i.e., how many studies which describe imagination find activation in the pHipp?) 
Reverse inference is based on the relative frequency of studies, which have an activation in a 
region and also use a functional term (i.e., how many studies which show activation in the 
pHipp say they are observing imagination?).
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